

Mr. Johnson, ORR

Mr. Bishop 221 (e.g. in "unreported" status) - c. Oct.

Major Burdette 2-1

15 Jun 63 CIB

See 3/3/ CORON/201-64

Mohr's letter

same

NSC Trans. Alm 18-5334

c/o CORON/205-64

14 Jun 64 2052Z

Oct 10 different Frontiers set up on U-2 flight 27 Oct,  
only 1 earlier, 17 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel command, no defense, Russia, on 27 Oct.

14 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 on "attack" on an unidentified jet

conf was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was

not mentioned. This attack was possibly directed against the

Los Angeles 5714 site adjacent to the Ladd site and believed  
(Earscudder)

to be in direct communication with them. During this time, it informed

it, it brought to his test he was "advancing" with his unit.

It indicated that these persons may have been flying his "advances"

and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions addressed

mention of regiments for dangerous and the departure of these soldiers

It ultimately requested that a report of the whole affair be sent to

Up a later communication revealed he was to speak to him from the following  
morning. The US was informed that there had been no [?] to

resident, presumably of the Los Angeles 644 site.

V - Relation of Christian Vittor Davidov, prob. SFC commander till

departure 31 Aug 63

M: "I have a suspicion that there has been an attack" — "one of  
our comrades was shot and wounded." national vehicle had  
gunpointed and that he was "achieving" with his units. Later,  
MPLTSOV indicated 3 hours ago had heard during his return, "if  
others wanted" needed the supplies. 2 doctors sent

[other comrades?] V wanted M to report to him in person.  
"tomorrow morning" — "at what time?"

[Attack on Camo?]

~~Attack on Camo that day,~~

(This attack was not Camo's main combat site — though unit rebuked —  
because M was "advancing." Nothing on attackers — could be Centro Troops.  
This attack over by noon. but not to reliable 2nd site still held by  
them. What initiative did. was taken at all? That obvious when  
told.) (D. note; when was imminent attack reported to them? By report  
of Centro commanding a route with traps?)

Dr. Munroen - D.R.K.

cc: Dr. Bush 221 (e.g. in "Emergency" 15 March 1965)

Atty. General's Office

5 fm 43 CIB

See 3/3/ CORON/801-64

Moshe Gold

same

Miss Diane Allen 13-5334

C/O CORON/805-64

14 Oct 64 2052Z

Oct 10 different Presidents set up on U-2 flight 27 Oct,  
only 1 earlier, 17 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel command, no defense, Russia, on 27 Oct.

4 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 on "attack" on an undetected but  
comp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was  
not mentioned. The attack was possibly directed against the  
Los Angeles 8911 with reference to the Command and Control  
(Commander)  
to be in direct communication. During this time, it informed  
X. It passage to the fact he was "involved" with its unit.  
This indicates that these persons may have had during his "involvement"  
and that 15 others were involved. Subsequent discussions indicated  
numerous segments for weapons and the location of these doctors  
of whom I suggested that a report of the same appear to be sent to  
the Atty. General's office in view of the following  
comment. The US was informed what down the morning with [?].

violent, probably by the two Rydhs boys etc.

V. Relation of Christian Vittor Davidov, prob. SFC commander till  
departure 31 Aug 63

M: "I have a suspicion that there has been an attack" ... and  
our comrade was shot and wounded." national vehicle had  
gunnered and that he was "advancing" with his unit. Later,  
MILITEST indicated 3 persons may have fired during his advance, and  
others wanted medical treatment. I doctor sent  
[other comanders?] V wanted M to report to him in person.  
"because many" - "at what time?"

[Attack on Comdo?]

What happened to Comdo?

This attack was not Comdo main assault site - though unit vehicle  
claim it was "advancing," nothing on streets - could be Center Block.  
This attack over by noon, but not explained Comdo site still held by  
what indications will was, first into all? That obvious was  
not in the site, when our command staff reported to town? By report  
in Comdo commanding a unit with tanks?

(Siverts recommendations & a math rule; a request for  
low-level 1

reason for <25% cover per

No real urgency about SSMs emerges anywhere.

(as reason for non-expansive flights).

Committee preoccupied with needs for low-level plots, and  
for organizing & improving total coverage, for technical (planning  
and technical reasons — a response to what was  
already there to be seen, not to what might be found.

Were advantages to losses, of success, fully spelled out in earlier NIE's?

Note: a) reversals in judgments (e.g. limited attack

= less/equal/more likely to provoke retal.  
(than invasion.)

b) discrepancies in factors (military, financial, resources, etc)

c) lack of any commit bearing on the strategy that was followed: threat of attack, supported by actions: blockade, mobilization; deployment; and letters, specific threats.

(blockade considered only in isolation;  
otherwise, military attack).

a) didn't direct (12 Oct)

(see, Chet Cooper)

[Cries emerge according to the logic of Provocation,  
not the logic of deliberate calculated & informed response.]

Ross

Bob Munson ORR

Arch Bush OCI (e.g. on "incidents" attacks on 26 Oct.)

Mrs. Shirley Burkirk OSI

15 Jun 63 CIB

See 3/01 CURUN/R01-64

28 Month in Castro

several  
NSA Frank Allen 13-5334

c/o CURUN/R05-64  
14 Apr 64 2052Z

28 Oct 10 different Frontiers lit up on U-2 flight 27 Oct,  
only 1 earlier, 19 Oct. This didn't happen later.

Also, multi-channel comm channel, air defense, Russia, on 27 Oct.

14 April 64 On night of 26 Oct 62 an "attack" on an unidentified Sov camp was in progress. The nationality of the attacking forces was not national. This attack was possibly directed against the Los Angeles SAM site adjacent to the Barro site and believed (Barro commander) to be in direct comm. with them. During this time, M informed X at Santiago de Cuba that he was "advancing" with his unit. Later M indicated that three persons may have died during his "advance" and that 15 others were wounded. Subsequent discussions indicated national regiments for surgeons and the dispatch of seven doctors

[Timing?] [Fwd.] M ultimately requested that a report of the whole affair be sent to Vf a later communication indicated he was to report to Vn from the following morning. The US crew mission was shot down the morning after [?] the [Time]

incident, reportedly by the Los Angeles SSM site.

V - Letter of Aviation Viktor Davidov, prob. SFC commander till  
departure 31 Aug 63

M: "I have a suspicion that there has been an attack" . . . "one of  
our comrades was shot and wounded." national vehicle had  
overturned and that he was "advancing" with his unit. Later,  
MACITSEV indicated 3 persons may have died during his advance, and  
15 others wounded. neutral tree sappers. 2 doctors sent  
[other casualties?] V wanted M to report to him in person  
"tomorrow morning" — "at what time?"

[Attack on Banes?]

[What makes you think so?]

(This attack was not Banes main missile site — though can't exclude —  
because M was "advancing" Nothing on attackers — could be Castro Troops.)

This attack over by morning, but can't exclude SSM site still held by  
morning. What instructions site was held at all? That prisoners were  
taken? (CIA note) When was innocent attack reported at time? Any report  
on Castro surrounding a site with troops?

Stevenson - Sec. 10/31/62

Sov. Ambassador [to Havana] told U Thant:

Order from K to dismantle received before 1 and PM. Started dismantling at 5 on Sunday. Will be all over at latest by Friday, when we will have finished bulldozing of sites. Even the pads will be gone, but no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.

As to aircraft, Russians assured them that Cubans had not been trained to fly them... Any equipment, Sov-manned will go. All the A-A, both SAM and conventional, is manned by Cubans. It was a Cuban colonel that shot down our plane.

Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic...

Rihyke... please lay off the recon till Friday. After that you will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.

11/1/62 Ball - Sec.

Castro talked as though he had all the anti-aircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had shot down Major Anderson. Rihyke himself is not at all persuaded that this was just only boastfulness on his part.

He feels that there is a state of very definite kind of hysteria down there at the moment; that they are probably going to be looking for flights today, and that they are going to throw everything that they have. After Castro makes his speech he thinks that if we could delay until tomorrow that the chances of getting into any real trouble are considerably diminished, particularly if we change the flight patterns.

(Mikoyann didn't want to have to invite Zorin, [so] didn't want Adlai... U.N.)

Rihyke said on a Security Council meeting that Castro would ask him to hold the meeting off till after the 6th...

Sec.: Why the 6th!

Ball: Why, our elections.

(Mikoyann didn't want to have to invite Zorin, [so] didn't want Adlai... U.N.)